Besires Theory is Fully Consistant with the Humean View Essay -- Ethic

AbstractOne Humean go out holds that motivation requires beliefs and desires, which be separate anddistinct mental states. Beliefs are dispose to run the world, and desires are disposed to make theworld fit them. This scene is thought to eliminate besire possible action, according to which moraljudgments have both a world-mind direction of fit by representing the ethical facts of the matter,and a mind-world direction of fit by motivating action accordingly. Here I argue that besires arefully consistent with the Humean view. The Humean view should be cast at the direct of types,while besire theory is supported by introspection on psychological tokens. Existent Humeanarguments against besires do not go through, and besire theory remains a viable optionindeed,the option best supported by the take the standwithout rejecting the Humean view.1A Case for Besires tally to the Humean view of motivation, beliefs alone cannot motivate. Accordingbesire theory,1 more or less first perso n moral judgments (judgments of the form I chastely ought to )are both belief-like and desire-like in that they represent things as they morally are, and motivateappropriate actions. For example, on besire theory my judgment I ought to visit my gran in the hospital can both represent a literal moral obligation and motivate me tovisit my grandmother without the help of some separate desire-type psychological state.Can besire theory be right? non under the Humean view, for on that view besire theorymistakenly attri only whenes motivationally hot, desire-like properties to a plastered class of beliefs. Itwould seem that our options are highly constrained either we coddle the Humean view, andcharacterize first person moral judgments as belie... ...o necessary connections in the midst of distinct mental state tokens, simpliciter internalism entailsbesire theory.12 Shafer-Landau argues for a similar position, though he calls some beliefs intrinsicallymotivating. Shafer-Landau 2004, 147-48.13 Only when we combine besire theory with an essentialist claim, for example, that no statecounts as a besire unless it actually motivates, do we take off the result that moral judgmentsnecessarily motivate. This essentialist claim is too strong for all desire-type state, for evenoccurent, normal desires combined with relevant means-related beliefs can fail to fool theirfunctional role.14 One might think that the standard cognitive view of moral judgments evades the burden ofshowing how moral motivation fails, but thereby gains the burden of explaining the reliableconnection between moral judgments and motivation.